South Africa's decision to enter the First World War was not easy. After a difficult interplay between Whitehall and Tuinhuis, the Botha government agreed to secure limited strategic objectives in neighbouring German South West Africa. An armed insurrection had to be suppressed first. When both these objects were achieved, and following a further British appeal, South African troops moved further afield. This move, representing South Africa's second 'little bit', was a dangerous step for the Botha government. The despatch of troops to France was controversial. Yet, by the end of 1915, South African expeditionary forces were en route to Europe and East Africa. This paper investigates the political crisis in South Africa and the difficult decision to send troops out of Africa, their deployment in an environment entirely foreign to the South African way of war, and the impact of the Western Front on the drawing of 'lessons' by post-war Union authorities.
Introduction: 'Our Thermopylae, our Morgarten'
The title for this paper draws on two sources; one a letter from William Carter, the Archbishop of Cape Town, and the other a 21 July 1915 newspaper call for volunteers to serve in France with a South African infantry brigade. For the Union of South Africa, which had a fortnight earlier brought the German South West campaign to a successful conclusion, this would be the country's 'second little bit'. 1 The stance of the South African prelate, captured in his wartime correspondence with a cleric friend in Britain, was typical of other English-South Africans at the time.
After succumbing easily to the wave of early-war enthusiasm, he had settled by mid-1915 into a new realism. 2 The accounts of the fighting in Europe were terrible and, as he admitted, he did not understand how men could stand the brutality of it all. Yet, while he saw too that there were most probably 'worse things to come', he embraced the notion that the war was being fought for civilisation and justice and for these reasons, despite the horribleness, it was also 'all splendid.' 3 Soldiers at the front, situated at the tactical level and subjected to the full experience of the trenches, shared other ideas. Lt Cyril NewtonThompson, a perceptive South African with the Royal Horse Artillery in France, derided the generals, the politicians, a gullible public, in fact everything about the war. Any gains would be more than offset by the losses, which, he lamented, would be appalling, ' The soldiers will have gone to their last long rest recking [sic] little of why it all was, except that they thought our cause the better, & it will be left to the historian & especially the student of military history to determine whether in the great offensive of June-July-August 1916 the game was worth the candle.' 4 As Newton-Thompson predicted, this question has drawn its historians and other commentators. For South Africa, the focus has always been, most specifically, Delville Wood. This tradition commenced on 18 July 1917, when a large crowd gathered at the Town Hall in Cape Town to mark the first Delville Wood Day. The tribute, offered 'to the memory of the noble band of South Africans who … made the supreme sacrifice at Delville Wood under circumstances which have won imperishable glory for their country', was, as the Cape Times reported, 'most impressive … and in every respect … worthy of the great anniversary that it marked.' 5 And it was a great anniversary for several reasons. First, although only an episode on the Western Front, it was far more than that to the South Africa of the day. Delville Wood was, according to John X. Merriman, elder statesman and former Cape prime minister, 'the first stiff fight' in which the new Union Defence Force (UDF) 'met under the most extreme conditions of modern warfare' and where they showed 'themselves not unequal to the dreadful task.' The Somme and, more specifically, Delville Wood, was moreover a sacred place where South Africans stood, not only together, but with the rest of the British World, and halted German militarism. And therefore, although 'only an episode in the great strife', it defined not only the grittiness of the South African soldier, but also South Africa's place as a constituent of a larger British World and as part of the allied coalition that halted despotism. It was Merriman felt South Africa's Thermopylae, her Morgarten. 6 This line has been assumed, both by soldiers and historians, with the result that Delville Wood, South Africa's special part in the Battle of the Somme, looms large in South African military history. Contemporary soldiers played the first part in this construction. Major-General William Furse, commander of the 9 th Division, of which the South African Brigade formed part, described the events around Longueval as 'one of the greatest battles in the world's history', while Lieutenant-General Henry Rawlinson, his immediate superior, declared that 'with the capture of Delville Wood, the gallantry, perseverance and determination of the South African Brigade deserves the highest commendation.' 7 Delville Wood, almost inevitably, has been used by politicians and nation-builders of pre-1994 white South Africa and in a book, published in 2006, Delville Wood is, yet again, billed as one of the 'seven battles that shaped South Africa.' Infantry Brigade formed the core of this presence, but did not fight in the vicinity of the five batteries of heavy artillery or the signal company or, indeed, the South African General Hospital stationed near Abbeville. All were served by the men of the South African Native Labour Corps (SANLC). Besides, there were also South Africans in many British battalions and regiments and in the Flying Corps. Nevertheless, the focus of the historian of South Africa's part in the campaign has always been with the Infantry Brigade, which was not only the most visible South African contribution to the main battleground, but, to invoke Buchan, claimed 'to have had no superior and not many equals.' 9 More recently, these studies, often simply chronicling events, have been supplemented by studies of the activities of the SANLC, which arrived in France in late 1916, too late for the battle of the Somme. 10 During the past decade, much new work has been done exploring both 'identity' as well as the meaning of the battle to a modern, collective, new South Africanism. 11 The aim of this paper, which draws on an array of official and private papers, is to investigate the South African experience of the battle of the Somme, cast against the background of the political crisis in South Africa and the difficult decision to send troops out of Africa and the deployment of these troops in an environment entirely foreign to the South African way of war. A small assemblage of South Africans, all second, third and lower-tier figures, are used as lenses through which to view these processes. 33, 66-67.) Unsurprisingly therefore, Louis Botha, former Boer general and now wartime prime minister, battled to achieve and then maintain consensus in his cabinet. Faced with potential defections and the growing rift in Afrikanerdom, his first wartime ministry was unstable and his second ministry, formed after the October 1915 election, could only govern with Unionist support, though not in formal coalition (table 1) . Nationally, Botha found himself between two camps: a 'British' sector, wanting to involve South Africa fully in the war, and an Afrikaner camp, wanting South Africa to remain neutral. The first considered it South Africa's duty, as a loyal dominion of the empire, to freely support the British war effort. In fact, during the 1912 defence debate, the Unionists had predicted a time when South Africa would not only have to assume responsibility for her own defence, but also offer the 'old country' the support of a South African expeditionary force. 16 It seemed a pity that these men, willing to serve in Europe, were not fighting as South Africans. Moreover, as Graaff acknowledged, the government was under increasing pressure and they would have to do something 'to meet the demands of those who are anxious to see a contingent depart.' In fact, Pretoria, recognising that the conclusion of the South West campaign would produce a large number of unemployed men, was quite happy 'to have [these men] at the front than on our hands.' 38 For these reasons, the cabinet decided to send another contingent. But where was this 'second little bit' to be sent?
Two theatres were proposed. The first was the main battleground in France, where the other dominions were already well-represented. The other was East Africa. The latter, supposedly 'more in our line' than a European campaign, was supported by a wide number of Britons and South Africans. A small contingent in France would not only be 'swallowed up in the enormous armies' and lose their identity, but, as Graaff noted to Smuts, South Africans had neither the training nor the campaign experience to fit them for the Western Front; whereas in Tanganyika, South Africa would have her own 'show' once again and South African troops 'could fight in their own way.' 39 Smuts liked the idea of Tanganyika too. He agreed with the military arguments, the promise of mobility, South Africa's strong suite, in which mounted infantry could play a role, but recognised also that, if South Africa conquered the territory, some sort of exchange with Mozambique might consolidate territories south of the Zambezi and Kunene rivers. 40 However, Britain had requested specifically an infantry contingent and for the Somme theatre of operations and, when Pretoria responded to London's call, they expressed their 'readiness to render all the assistance in their power in prosecuting the war in Europe and elsewhere.' 41 In doing so, Pretoria hoped to satisfy the British request as well as their own subimperial goals. In pursuance of this dual policy, Pretoria agreed to send a contingent to Europe, which would be composed of the volunteers they expected in large numbers, perhaps sufficient to form a second and even a third brigade. 42 In fact, with the campaign in GSWA at end, Smuts was confident that South Africa would be able to raise three infantry brigades and then they might even consider forming a South African division. 43 However, Smuts was to be disappointed. The recruitment drive opened on 21 July 1915, in time to draw the troops returning victorious from German South West. 44 A call was made both for heavy artillery as well as infantry, 45 although the War Office had asked specifically for infantry. As expected, there was a flurry of interest, particularly from inhabitants of British blood. 46 Men rushed again to the colours. Some, like Louis Matthews, writing once the brigade had been formed, was 'afraid of being left in the cold.' 47 However, in view of the small white population and the complexity of South Africa's other tasks, including the pending deployment to Tanganyika, it was agreed that South Africa could not raise and maintain in France much more than a brigade. Buchan has suggested that Botha, not wanting to 'denude the country of too many of her most loyal and vigilant citizens', could in fact send no more than a brigade of infantry to Europe. 48 On August 10, 1915, Botha informed Buxton that the South African contingent would comprise one infantry brigade, one signalling company, one field ambulance and one general hospital, in addition to five batteries of heavy artillery and some, if not the whole, of the personnel for five four-gun batteries (13-pounder quick-firing) of field artillery and some aviation personnel, together with aeroplanes and accessories. 49 Botha, however, noted rather ominously that reinforcement 'may prove difficult.' 50 The force was established in accordance with the war establishments fixed for the New Armies 51 and the British government assumed liability for pay -an issue soon to have political consequences. 52 The four battalions, brigaded as the 1 st South African Infantry Brigade, were, as indicated in table 2, 'designed to represent the main divisions of the Union, and recruits were given the option of joining the regiment affiliated to their own province.' 53 This
formed part of a difficult, but broad-fronted attempt to gain language equity and balance sectarian interests. As it transpired, the two main military efforts were to be East Africa and France, where Smuts, himself, and Brig Gen H.T. (Tim) Lukin were to command respectively, the former representing the Afrikaans sector, the latter the English. Moreover, with only about 15 percent of the original brigade being Afrikaans, the bulk of the contingent that went to France was English, although by the end of the war, the proportion of Afrikaners had increased to about 30 percent. 54 Buchan has suggested that Afrikaners, renown as mounted riflemen and having enhanced this reputation in GSWA, were not attracted to Britishstyle infantry and so they were by preference destined for Tanganyika. However, in truth, the military experience of those leaving the Union was quite irrelevant to the tasks at hand, both in Tanganyika and France. The Union Defence Force, although established in July 1912 and still in embryo when the war broke out, was not inexperienced. But, this experience was all South African, and, almost exclusively of the small-war variety. Moreover, the UDF was a rather difficult marriage of four disparate forces, representing at least three military traditions and speaking two languages. Sectarian interest was very strong and this did not facilitate organisational design and effective command. 56 64 As the elements of the South African expeditionary force approached the Western Front, the South African parliament was prorogued after a session, described by her husband, the shadow defence minister, as most unwarlike. 65 Miners' phthisis and the university question seemed very South African, narrow and unimportant against the backdrop of a world war and the vital imperial issues with which the conflict was associated. 66 Moreover, the political and military situation had not improved. Amidst Nationalist rhetoric and rumours of another rebellion, silence from German East Africa seemed ominous. If the campaign seemed to be stalling there, at least the news from France was more encouraging and, with the arrival of the South African expeditionary force, eyes in South Africa were firmly fixed on the Western Front. 67 The 1 st South African Infantry Brigade arrived in Marseilles from 20
April 1916 and trained via Lyons to Versailles and then on to Abbeville. 68 They arrived at Hazebrouck on 23 April where, for the first time, they experienced the artillery and aircraft activity then characteristic of the Western front. 69 Over the next days the regiments were kitted out (they found that 'the gas helmets already in possession' were 'the wrong pattern & unserviceable'). Much training was done and specifically in bayonet and trench fighting, bombing, attacking from trenches and 'moving up over ground swept by long range artillery fire to reinforce our own front line.' 70 The Brigade, having moved to Le Bizet, was strafed for the first time on 20 May and shelled repeatedly during the following days, 71 experiencing their first 8-inch shell fire on 23 May. 72 The Brigade moved, 'often a very trying journey through the mud', to Grovetown Valley on 30 June. 73 Two medical outfits accompanied the brigade: a field ambulance and a general hospital. 74 The 1 st SA Field Ambulance moved to France in April 1916, following the conclusion of the Sanussi campaign in Egypt. The ambulance comprised three sections each with three medical officers and 60 other ranks: A Section was the headquarters unit under the unit commander; while B and C sections were each under the command of a major. The sections were divided into tent and bearer subsections or divisions. The bearer divisions were placed with the brigade, while the tent divisions were grouped into a dressing station for wounded able to march the approximate six kilometres from the front line; a main dressing station (at the divisional headquarters) some 15 kilometres from the front line; and a corps rest area, some 22 kilometres from the front, where recuperating patients and the warweary were taken up for final recovery. During the first phase of the battle of the Somme this was at Chateau Corbie. Medivac was in the form of a chain; wounded able to march and bearer casualties were taken by regimental bearers (responsible for field dressing) to the regimental medical post. Wounded able to march were taken from here to the dressing stations where they were further cared for by the staff of the Field Ambulance. , were formed, but, when they arrived on the Western Front, they were broken up and their guns and personnel distributed among the other South African batteries. Also in 1918, the South African batteries were brought together and two South African brigades of heavy artillery were formed. 82 However, as the historian of 72 nd Siege Battery noted, despite a 'wonderful keenness' displayed by all ranks, their 'training facilities were not of the best, for the guns at the disposal of the batteries were by no means up to date and new methods of warfare, suitable to the changed conditions on the Western front, were constantly being brought out.' Moreover, on arrival in Britain, it was announced that the batteries would be siege batteries, armed with six-inch howitzers, 'a new weapon then under construction', and affiliated to the Royal Garrison Artillery. 83 This, Ernest Lane, one of the officers, thought a mistake:
'The greatest asset a South African has is his mobility and power to trek around, and they should have given us animal traction guns which are easier to learn how to handle, and then sent us off to some of the more distant and warmer scenes of war, whereas now we are siege artillery, tractor-drawn, with guns 96-inch howitzers that require the highest technical knowledge, and are likely to get to Flanders, where all the men will get horribly tucked up with cold.' 84 However, despite such gloomy forecasts, the batteries not only performed well, but enjoyed a life far more pleasant than that experienced by the brigade. The 73 rd Siege Battery, for example, was, in July 1916, 'comfortably billeted in farm buildings, while the guns were sited for camouflage purposes under fruit trees in an orchard' and 'at this time the surrounding country and village behind the lines showed little signs of war.' The battery's historian records that 'everything was fresh & green', a countryside that was beautiful and to be enjoyed, 'and the general consensus of opinion throughout the Battery was that the war -to quote the popular expression -was "a good war".' 85 For the staff of the South African General
Hospital, which moved to a location near Abbeville in mid-July, this was equally so. 86 However, as the 73 rd 's historian noted, 'conditions gradually became harder.'
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The much-expected, great offensive commenced in the Somme sector on July 1. The South Africans all along the British sector of the line, witnessed something of the opening of the offensive, and were eager recipients of early news passed back from the immediate front by own forces as well as captured Germans. 88 Before midday on July 1, the first prisoners arrived in batches of fifty in Grovetown Valley. One prisoner told Bamford that the attack had been expected for the past four days. Their officers had told them that the Scottish divisions of the British Army were in front of them and that these divisions 'took no prisoners.' As a consequence, they had had no sleep for four days and nights! 89 The massive bombardments, according to Bamford, were 'as intense an artillery bombardment as has ever been heard during the whole war on any front.' 90 And, with 'dead Bosches [Germans] … lying everywhere in their trenches & the ground beyond', the news was 'extremely good' and the South Africans were, Bamford records, 'anxious to be sent forward.' 91 Forming part of the corps reserve, they were eager to be in the thick of the action. Back in South Africa, a news-hungry public, aware that the great offensive had commenced, eagerly awaited the first reports. 92 With the Allies attacking on all fronts, and the Russian advance supposedly going 'on and on like a song from Boris Gudonov' 93 , Germany's defeat now seemed inevitable. Now, at last, the South Africans were doing something or were about to do something, and as part of an attack that, it seemed, would not 'fizzle out in a week.' 94 The good war news bolstered British prestige and that of the Botha government, and so quietened Boer dissatisfaction. Hertzog even published a letter in the press, calling for restraint among the extremists in his party. Other Nationalist leaders followed suite, expressing their intention of adhering to constitutional means in addressing grievances. 96 English South Africans believed that nationalists around the empire were more careful and as a consequence of the fate of Irish nationalists in the wake of the Easter Rising. Yet, Maud Wyndham felt it 'so different being away from it all.' 97 She wanted to be in the midst of events, nursing soldiers in France or doing war work in London, where she could hear 'everything rather than being in [South Africa] missing things, even croaks & grumbles [which] I suppose go on all the time even now when the news is so good -or at any rate veering slowly but surely in our favour.' 98 Nonetheless, through July 1916, she thought the war news cheering, 'as progress really seems steady on our side all round.' It made a great difference to read the papers then. Formerly the allies 'were forever "retreating to straighten our line" or to "consolidate our position".' 99 Not for a moment doubting Germany's eventual defeat, Mrs Wyndham dreaded 'all the unhappiness every hour' brought. 100 However, no matter how terrible, she felt that at least they now had something 'to show for [the losses].' 101 By 8 July the Brigade was in the trenches on the edge of Bernafray Woods and over the ensuing days, during the battles for Bernafray Woods and Trones Woods and then Longueval and Delville Wood, casualties increased to the extent that the planned pattern of medical evacuation disintegrated. The casualties were numerous and the task of the bearers, having to carry wounded to the forward dressing station at Bernafray Wood, while also pummelled by the war, was enormous. SSgt Walsh, of the bearer section, collected a DCM. The movement of casualties from the dressing stations to the hospital was also no easy task; patients were despatched by train, motor vehicle and, for the most serious cases, by barge on the Somme. Table 3 shows that thirty-nine percent of the casualties occurred on a single day, July 18, when, due to the arrival of large convoys of wounded, No 2 Stationary Hospital became more of a clearing station. 103 Over the following days, as the casualties among the South African Infantry and South African Field Artillery increased, life at the South African hospital at Abbeville became more hectic. The hospital, now receptacle for overflow from the nearby British hospital as well as cases that arrived directly, faced several difficulties. The first of these was dealing with the British hospital system and, the second, the weather. Having just taken up 243 new cases on July 24, Knox records:
'Unsatisfactory methods by which these people kept their books made it extremely difficult at first to find out where we were. Table 4 : Through flow of patients at the South African General Hospital, Abbeville, July 1916 • Among these were many amputations resulting from gas gangrene due to corrosive shell and gas shell. Knox was 'fed up with [the] unsatisfactory way patients were left to the mercy of a willing and efficient but ill-equipped staff.' 105 The nature of the cases presented a third range of challenges. On July 24 the South African hospital lost two patients from gas gangrene following gunshot wounds, all 'fearful wounds' Knox thought. 106 These varied from serious bullet and shell wounds to gassing and shell shock. 107 The following day was 'absolute hell.' The medical officers were pushed to the limit in the operating tents, the orderlies in the wards, and the bearer division, under Major Pringle, worked to the limit conveying casualties to the field ambulance and on to the hospital. 108 Knox, an administration sergeantmajor, spent a few hours on some days in the theatre when not engaged in the evacuation of patients to England and elsewhere. His diary gives an impression of the work of the hospital, although accurate data cannot be compiled from it. Nonetheless, with 243 new patients on 24 July and the evacuation of 118 on 23 July and the same number two days later, this must have been frenzied (table 4) .
The medical officers and orderlies were perhaps the first to hear of the 'terrible suffering of the Brigade in the Wood. Roll call only revealed 80 of each regiment, percentage of officers killed very large.' 109 As shown in The heavy casualties sustained by the Brigade during July made the resumption of the recruitment of reinforcements a 'most pressing necessity.' 112 In fact, on 4 July 1916, before the Brigade entered the frontline, the Army Council had raised the matter of recruiting to fill the coming losses. A monthly intake of 10% of establishment was suggested. 113 Botha postponed his answer. He left for German East Africa on July 11 to consult with Smuts. 114 By early August, he had still not replied. London probed Pretoria again. 115 Bourne, the civilian head of the defence department, doubted whether they would be able to recruit much more than Smuts' requirements for East Africa. However, recognising that the situation regarding the Brigade, owing to the very heavy casualties, was grave, Bourne suggested that they would soon know whether the East Africa campaign was likely be prolonged and, if so, on Botha's return, they would make a special recruiting effort, which, if successful, might even produce some 500 to 1000 recruits for France, in addition to meeting the need for troops in Tanganyika.
Yet Botha, persistently unrealistic, hoped still to supply a complete division with reserves for France. An early end to the Tanganyika campaign would release men for Europe. Buxton, however, shared Bourne's caution. The governor-general warned Botha that, if South Africa was to field a division, he would need, in addition to the brigade already in France, a further twenty-eight thousand recruits over the next six months. Furthermore, as Buxton noted, mounted troops, even with rebellion and German West and East Africa experience, would not be of much use in France. A South African Infantry Division was, therefore, out of the question and all that could be done to increase South African visibility in France was to brigade the multifarious South African units together in the same division. 117 Botha returned from Tanganyika knowing that the campaign there was not at an end. He knew too that there was 'no reasonable prospect of reopening recruiting for the 1 st South African Infantry brigade with any chance of success, and at the same time of keeping pace with the requirements of Union Imperial Service Infantry Units in East Africa for reinforcements to replace wastage.' 118 He faced two choices. Firstly, await a successful conclusion to the campaign in Tanganyika before reopening the recruitment drives and then raise the additional units allowing the formation of a complete South African Division. 119 Or, secondly, recruit concurrently for both Smuts and Lukin. Botha, wanting to cover both his sub-imperial and prestige objectives, opted for the second.
Two recruiting campaigns started on September 1. However, amidst the outcry over pay 120 and complaints regarding the irregularity of supply in Tanganyika, far fewer recruits than were expected came forward. Since Botha's appeal on August 17, 2084 recruits were obtained, but only 146 for the Brigade in France. This fell far short of the draft of 600, which was the minimum requirement. Yet, the Union cabinet thought the general result of the appeal neither unsatisfactory nor surprising. The recruits had gravitated to East Africa for two reasons: they 'felt that the first call on them was for the arduous campaign close to their gates' and the fact that East Africa offered a better rate of pay. Although recruitment for the brigade in France was of the utmost importance, only 100 infantry left for Europe that October. The ministers requested the Army Council to 'understand the position' and the 'difficult circumstances' under which these arrangements were made. 121 By September the offensive on the Somme had clearly petered out. This and the mixed reports from German East Africa, where the progress was slow and the complaints many, did much to undermine Botha's position in South Africa. The failure of the recruitment drives was a symptom of this. To return to the question posed by Lt Cyril Newton-Thompson on 7 July 1916, was 'the game worth the candle.' 122 The men sent abroad seemed to be paying a tremendous price, exposed either to the malarial jungles and rigours of East Africa or the trenches and brutalisation of industrial warfare in France. For the allied powers, the ostensible victors, victory was bittersweet. For South Africa, this was little different. Although South Africa emerged physically unscathed, the price tag, in money and sacrifice, had been high. 123 Although
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South African casualties were comparatively low, when compared with the other dominions (table 7) , most of the 7121 killed had died on the Western Front. For South Africa, a country accustomed to limited wars and low ownforce casualties, these losses were unacceptable. Furthermore, the war, together with the rebellion and rumour of rebellion, had come at a political cost, increasing as it did popular suspicion of government, leaders, and institutions like the military. It discredited Botha and Smuts, the wartime ministers, and, although temporarily aligning South Africa with the allied powers, estranged Smuts and those of broader vision from the mass of Afrikaners.
Coming to terms with the carnage
This was, of course, not a phenomenon uniquely South African. Generals, across the board, were blamed for the costly failures of the war. Military commanders on all sides were criticised and quite severely, for the apparent waste of human life in a succession of offensives that gained little, while they, it would said, were safe, back at their HQ's enjoying the best France could offer. Many South Africans saw Delville Wood as an example of this callousness. Maud Wyndham went a step further and blamed the Allied generals for these military 'muddles' and accused many of them of being incompetent and lacking in the mental ability needed to effect a breakthrough. She was even more critical towards the political leaders, who she accused of not supporting the generals at the front with a workable and realistic grand strategy to win the war. 'Providence', she lamented, 'has not given us a Chatham and a Marlborough to guide us thro this period.' 124 Yet, although it was 'no use girding against the poor minnows we have got', Mrs Wyndham was convinced, as many South Africans were, that 'there [were] things even a minnow might avoid.' 125 The South African leadership, although praised in Britain for their stance, was at times, for both the British sector in South Africa as well as the Afrikaner right, an object for amusement or of scorn. Furthermore, the politicians were blamed for not facilitating a solution to the deadlock. The politicians, Newton-Thompson complained, were 'prepared to fight to the last drop of blood of the soldiers at the front.' 126 And they did not seem to have any answers to the problems, answers which soldiers at the front seemed to have had. To quote NewtonThompson, who admitted he did 'not know enough about the interdependence of the German armies to know what effect our attack at the Somme has in helping the attack of our allies in other parts':
'The Allies must realize that if they are going to win this war (i.e. hands down) they must have roughly 3 men in the field to every two which the Politicians seemed the true enemy of the soldier, whose collective innocence and sacrifice was memorialised on plinth and in churches as almost Christ-like. Emily Hobhouse, writing in August 1914, blamed the politicians, 'who make troubles', for callously sending the troops in to be killed.
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Nichol, vocalising a popular sentiment three years later, reckoned that 'there is no doubt the politicians ought to get it in the neck, it's an awful shame that the soldiers should be the only ones to suffer.' 129 They had been exposed to the brutality of warfare in Europe, without, it was thought, proper leadership, and without proper training. Colonial volunteers ought not to have been thrown into the line against German professional militarism.
In the very different climate of the mid-1920s, the debate over the war that had not fully taken place at the war's end assumed a central place in the larger and at times quite vocal debate over South African foreign policy. The basic issues remained. Firstly, there was the question of the morality of the intervention. Ought South Africa to involve herself in foreign, imperial wars? And, closely associated with this, was the aversion for technological warfare, for the materielschacht. 130 Smuts himself wrote:
'There is much to make us profoundly sad and almost to despair of the future of the race when we see our greatest intellectual and scientific discoveries turned like so many daggers at the heart of civilization.' 131 The individual had to be recovered and returned to the centre stage; something it seemed could be done more easily in Africa, where human skill seemed to count for more. This raises the second matter, the wisdom of the intervention. Europe, simply stated, was not the place for South African military intervention. Warfare in Europe had to be avoided and, as a result, after 1924, the Union Defence Force refocused on Africa, where asymmetry would be to her advantage and was more suited to the South African way of war. The Somme had been geographically foreign, and its circumstances militarily unfamiliar.
The military 'lessons'
South Africa too went through several processes to deduce so-called 'lessons.' The first of these was conducted under Lukin and at the behest of the commander of the 9 th Division:
'The Division has done well in the recent fighting. We must now, while our several experiences are fresh in our memories, dig out and clarify by close discussion the lessons of the fighting so that we may do even better in the future.'
Furse called for frankness and an inclusive process, based not on 'fault finding' but 'fact finding', so that 'the best way of dealing with similar situations in the future' could be discovered. 133 A list of 'subjects for enquiry' was distributed and the South African report addressing numerous tactical matters, probably written by James Mitchell-Baker, the Brigade Major, was submitted by Lukin on 3 August 1916. 134 Several military publications were produced in South Africa between the two world wars. These included several drill manuals and textbooks 135 as well as the official history of the Great War, which appeared in 1924. The last, described by Agar-Hamilton decades later as having 'no outstanding merit', 136 was a overall, macro history and was a tremendous disappointment to MajorGeneral Jack Collyer, a wartime chief of the general staff, who had hoped for a utilitarian history that would draw lessons and make instruction material for officers at the South African Military College. 137 In view of this, Collyer, who was incidentally Lukin's brother-in-law, bridged the gap himself with two textbooks, one on the German South West Africa campaign (1937) and another on the German East African campaign (1939).
As far as Collyer was concerned European textbooks were irrelevant in Africa and he set about producing standard texts for warfare in Africa, deducing the 'lessons' in the nineteenth-century utilitarian, didactic fashion, neatly setout for the instruction of officers at the South African Military College. 138 Although, many of his 'lessons' were misinformed, they provide a rare insight into inter-war South African military thinking. Collyer, thought by some to be 'the Liddell-Hart of South Africa' 139 , pointed out and quite rightly that South Africa had not been prepared for war in 1914 and his first call was for the systematic collection and updating of information in Sub-Saharan Africa and 'the teaching of experience', emphasising both the importance of military history and the collection of accurate military information. Foreknowledge would lessen the difficulty in gaining strategic surprise, shorten campaigning in tropical Africa, and so limit casualties. However, Collyer, a mounted infantryman with fifty years of service in Africa, was clearly not a man for modern devices. He highlighted the problems of air power rather than possibilities 140 and discounted the immediate value of mechanised transport in Africa, only mounted troops could be relied upon, and so provided unwittingly a theoretical basis for the 'bush cart' policy of Oswald Pirow, who became defence minister in 1933. 141 The type of operations undertaken by South Africa in East Africa in 1940 and North Africa in 1941 had simply not been contemplated.
South Africa and the neutrality question
Nowhere was the impact of the Western Front for South Africa greater than on the nation's foreign policy. The war shattered any possibility for postrebellion, national reconciliation and left South Africans confused and deeply divided on the goals to be pursued and methods used. Even before it had ended, the traumatic experience of the war, combined with the apparent improvement of relations between Afrikaners and some English-South Africans, and a growing preoccupation with domestic problems, produced a drastic reordering of national priorities. Smuts had placed foreign policy consistently near the top of the ranking of national concerns, but by Hertzog's first term it was placed well down on the list.
The National party, while in opposition, equated military and industrial power with Smuts, holism and a Greater Britain. 142 The The indifference and tendency toward withdrawal so manifest immediately after the war also declined in the following decades as the Nationalists grappled with difficulty of having to marry ideology and reality. With time three broad principles emerged. Firstly, the zone of deployment for the UDF was Africa. It would only be applied for the immediate defence of South Africa, where it would enjoy the advantages of technological asymmetry. By implication it also meant that the UDF would never again be deployed to Europe and European warfare, as such, would be avoided. Secondly, the UDF would be a small force, well-equipped for its purpose. There would be an emphasis on mounted infantry and a small air force, but little room for mechanisation as the lack of infrastructure in Africa pointed to little use for it. And, finally, the UDF would nonetheless be sufficiently lethal to deal with internal conflict, sufficiently potent not to run the risk of many own-force casualties. This is seem at Bulhoek, the Bondelswarts uprising, the Rand revolt of 1922, and the Ipumbu uprising of 1931, where the UDF, deployed in three of these cases to conduct punitive operations, had great psychological advantage.
Nonetheless, the UDF was, like other forces, demobilised after November 1918 and large-scale rust-out took place from 1924, with the result that when the Second World War broke out in 1939, the Permanent and Active Citizen Forces were severely understrength and the Commandos, pet of the nationalist government, although reasonably equipped for their purpose, being rurally based and overwhelmingly Afrikaans and were not expected to support another 'British' war. Furthermore, much of the doctrine had not kept pace with technological developments. Mechanisation of ground forces and the application of new technology contrasted sharply with developments in Europe. Although South Africa had the industrial capacity for the development of armour and mechanised forces, arguments based upon the nature of potential enemy forces, poor infrastructure and terrain inaccessibility combined with government policy and financial stringency resulted in nothing being done. Southern Africa, the focus of South African defence policy, was also thought to be unfavourable for mechanised warfare. Inadequate roads and multifarious geographic features concentrated energy on the development of the air arm for operations in Africa and a system of coastal defences to repel a sea assault, as well as a mix of British and Boer-type infantry supported by field artillery. As a result, an expeditionary force had to be prepared from scratch after September 1939 and the first South Africans to serve in the Second World War only left the country in July 1940.
Conclusion
The First World War, fought for the future of liberal democracy, was necessary and had both meaning and purpose. It was not a futile waste, but fought for a cause. Yet, as Niall Ferguson has argued in The Pity of War, the war 'derailed the benign civilising mission of the British Empire.' Britain emerged from the conflict depleted and exhausted. This was the onset of retreat from empire, an uncomfortable reality that the most ardent imperialists around the Commonwealth had to accept after 1945. The moment the South African Unionists chose to seize, to draw South Africa closer to a Greater Britain, was ironically also the vehicle of the start of imperial decline. In South Africa the Nationalists, then largely still the Afrikaans far-right, came out strong and ready to take power with Labour in 1924.
The War differed from previous conflicts in terms of scope and intensity. Nations mobilised fully and the accompanying devastation unparalleled and the death toll unprecedented. For South Africa, attuned to small wars, limited 'native' campaigns, chiefly of pacification, and accustomed to low own-force casualties, the change to total warfare and the experience of the Western Front was cataclysmic. The South African stand at Longueval and Delville Wood lasted one week, almost precisely; from midday on July 14 to dusk on July 20, 1916 . This was the second most expensive week in South African military history, surpassed only in 1942 with the surrender at Tobruk.
More than a quarter of a million South Africans served on the different fronts: involving nearly twenty percent of the white male population. More than thirty thousand South Africans experienced the horror of trench warfare on the Western Front. Post-war governments wished to avoid such carnage in future and confine future operations to the continent of Africa. Politicians of all hue were determined not to send South Africans into the trenches again. As late as 1939, the general staff did not foresee the eventuality of South Africans fighting in the European theatre again and this was included in the Smuts formula of September 1939. The campaigns in German South West and East Africa, on the other hand, were, as John Buchan noted, 'frontier wars, fought for the immediate defence of her borders and her local interests.'
146 Africa south of the equator was the presumed zone of deployment for the UDF, which would be a small force, but, sufficiently lethal and psychologically overwhelming, and well-equipped for this purpose. 
